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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CAR DOCTOR, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

No. 17239

ANTHONY BELMONT and
GREGORY OLINYK,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action upon multiple causes of action for recovery
of capital contribution to a partnership upon the basis that
the partnership never came into existence; the counterclaim alleged breach of the partnership agreement resulting in prospective
loss and continuing current loss from the operation of the business which was ongoing at that time.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon trial before the court without a jury, judgment was
entered in favor of plaintiff against the defendants for $25,000
plus interest and costs and the counterclaim was dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the lower court's decision
and a finding that a partnership existed at all times and awarding defendants-appellants damages in an amount equal to plain-
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tiff's participatory share in losses sustained in the operat;e
of the business of the partnership.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In January (R.

211, passim) or February (R.

11-29), of 1977, Car Doctor,

Inc.,

105, lines

through its officers, Gord'

Giles and David Robinson, negotiated with Anthony Belmont anc
1

Gregory Olinyk regarding formation of a partnership to operat',
a private liquor club and restaurant in Ogden, Utah.
lines 5-30; R.

107; R.

175 and 176).

(R. 106,

On March 4, 1977, thep 0

ties entered into a preliminary agreement (Ex. 6-D) stating tc'
I

intent to form a partnership and setting forth conditions to

i

be met before the partnership would be effective, and grantinc 1
Car Doctor the right to nullify and void the partnership agree-\
I

in the event the conditions were not met.

At the time of exec;!

tion of the agreement, Car Doctor delivered a portion of i~ I
capital contribution,

$10, 000, waiving the requirement of escr:\.

of funds provided by the preliminary agreement.
20- 26).

On March 9,

1977,

(R. 115, lineol

(Ex. 7-D and attachment to Ex.

3-fl

the parties entered into the partnership agreement, and on Mar:
11, 1977, Car Doctor paid the balance of its capital contribu-'
tion,

$15, 000, which was deposited to the account of The Winer

(Ex. 4-P).
(25%)

Belmont's contribution for his twenty-five percen:

interest in the partnership was his expertise as

chef

~t

club operator and a sublease of the business premises of T~
Winery.

( R.

107, lines 4-6; R.

176, lines 9-11; Ex. 7-D ml,
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I

Olinyk's contribution of $10,000 (Ex. 7-D,

~3)

for a twenty five

percent (25%) share, was made on or about July 6, 1977.
lines 26-30; R. 214, lines 10-21).

(R. 213,

Prior to the grand opening of

the private club on March 18, 1977, and thereafter, Robinson and
Giles participated in initial operation of the business of The
Winery, painting, remodeling, cleaning up, greeting customers, and
the like.

(R. 111, lines 6-24; R. 124, lines 10-30; R. 190, lines

22-30).
In early May, 1977, the parties to this action together with
partners in Future Interests, Ltd., which owned the leasehold
improvements utilized by The Winery in its business (R. 166) met
for the purpose of discussing exercise of an option set forth in
Paragraph 7A of the sublease agreement (Ex. 10-D) to purchase the
leasehold improvements.

(R. 132, lines 13-30).

The following

day, from his own funds, Belmont paid to Future Interests, Ltd.,
$10,000 (R. 164) to exercise the option to purchase (R. 166, lines
13-30; Ex. 8-D

~l.(a)),

and later, an additional $10,000.

(R.

184, line 23).
After the meeting with Future Interests, Ltd., in May, Giles
and Robinson "were trying to do anything to recover" their money
(R. 153, lines 6 and 7); first negotiating for sale of their
partnership interest (R. 193 and 194; Ex. 9-D) and thereafter
simply denying the existence of the partnership.

(R. 152, lines

16-30; R. 153, lines 1-11).
Operation of the business ceased in mid-August, 1977 (R. 182,
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lines 24-28), having sustained a net operating loss of $ 36 ,-:
(R. 148, lines 1-12), not including $20,000 paid by Belmont':
his personal funds on behalf of the partnership to exercise:option to purchase the leasehold improvements ( R. 184, lines
13-23) nor an additional $5, 463 paid by Belmont from persone:

funds for business debt.
On June 23,

1977,

(R.

184,

lines 24-30; R.

185, linesj

this action was filed.

ARGUMENT
Point I

A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES CAME INTO
BEING PURSUANT TO WRITTEN AGREEMENT
Car Doctor relied upon the claim ( R.

3,

~8),

and the Cc,:·,

upon the finding (F.F. 7, R. 88) that certain conditions of

tr'\

preliminary agreement had not been met and thus, pursuant to

:I
I

agreement, Car Doctor had the right to void the written partn°·
ship agreement and receive back its capital contribution.
While Belmont was hampered in his ability to document
actions demonstrating compliance with the conditions of the

::;:I

4 agreement owing to the circumstances in which the partners~.::
business was terminated ( R.
duct of the business,

56-57),

his undisputed testimony. i

and conduct of the parties demonstrates

de facto compliance or waiver of compliance which, of course.
parties had the right to do.
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_J

"It is fundamental that
where parties have rights
under an existing contract,
they have exactly the same
power to renegotiate terms or
to waive such rights as they
had to make the contract in
the first place.
***
"'It is a well established
rule of law that parties to
a written contract may modify, waive, or make new
terms .... '" Chaney v. Rucker,
14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86
(1963), quoting Davis v.
Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d
1053, 348 P.2d 337 (1960).
Referring to the agreement (Ex. 6-D):
1.

Car Doctor did not dispute compliance with the condition

numbered 1.
2.

(R.

3, 118).

As to condition number 2, the testimony of Lowell Stone,

one of the trustees of Nottingham Mall Businessmen's Association,
is clear that an agreement had in fact been executed for the
management of The Winery by the performance of Belmont and the
other partners.

(R. 157-160).

Robinson admitted that Belmont

actually managed and operated The Winery during the period of the
claimed partnership pursuant to agreement with Nottingham Mall
Businessmen's Association (R. 127, lines 13-24).
3.

The third condition, evidence by Exhibit 10-D, admission

of which was refused by the trial court, required a sublease of
space and equipment from Nottingham Mall.

Exhibit 10-D was re-

garded by Lowell Stone, a partner of Future Interests, Ltd., and a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trustee of Nottingham Mall Businessmen's Association, dba 1 ~
Winery,

(R. 160, lines 12-24) and by Belmont (R. 178, lines;·

R.

lines 1-6), as the sublease and the authority under,.:.\

I

179,

The Winery was operated by Belmont as a partner.
4.

The fourth condition does not require that a liquor

license be issued in the name of Good Old Boys dba The Winer1 .:
the court implies (R.

204,

lines 12-17; R.

230,

lines 5-7), b1:

simply that the Liquor Commission approve management and other
contractual arrangements.

Belmont explained ( R. 203, lines i:-·

that the partners anticipated obtaining a new license

wh~ ~

one in the name of Nottingham Mal 1 Businessmen's Association::
The Winery,

Inc. , had expired, and further that all necessary

approval of himself as manager of The Winery and the employees
was obtained from the Liquor Commission.
204,

(R.

203,

line30;H

lines 1-11).
5.

While plaintiff claims that the fifth condition,

~

accounting of the funds contributed as of March 4 by Olin~~
not been made, Robinson testified (R.

108)

that Olinyk told hr

that the partnership needed money to begin renovation and payr;
of rents and so forth,

and that it was as a result of that urg'

need that the $10,000 was not placed in escrow.
20-26).

(R.

ll5, line

According to the testimony of Stone (R. 165), Belmont

(R. 180) and Olinyk (R.

219),

the $10,000 was accounted for ir.

total of $9,600 delivered to secure the sublease and ano
for drafting of the partnership agreement.

ther

5

Robinson tests c~
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dulity by claiming (R. 141, lines 14--27) that while the initial
money transactions were handled on a ''fairly informal basis" and
that he was frequently at the business prior to its opening, he
had no knowledge regarding application of the funds.
Giles spoke the truth when he said (R. 153, lines 6 and 7)
that,

"we were trying to do anything to recover our money" when

he and his partner Robinson relied upon the claim of non-perforrnance of conditions precedent as a basis for disavowal of the
Good Old Boys partnership.

Point II
THE PARTIES BY THEIR CONDUCT ARE ESTOPPED
FROM DENYING EXISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP
Nothing in the law of the State of Utah requires that an
agreement to form or operate as a general partnership need be
in writing.

Wholly apart from any writings which the parties

to this suit may have entered into, if, by their conduct, they
have held themselves out as partners, as they did, then no reference to a written document, executory or executed, can relieve
them from the obligations they have assumed.
Robinson testified that he and Giles were involved in getting
the business open, "painting and renovating, cleaning up the
cellar and stuff like that" (R. 111, lines 8 and 9) and that his
wife made the uniforms for the waitresses (R. 124, lines 28-30).
After the business opened, according to Robinson's testimony (R.
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111,

lines 13-24), he and Giles acted as greeters at the door,

"would also do certain chores or check on certain things, ask.,
how things were going, making comments or suggestions that it:.1
felt were appropriate to the business."

Giles stated (R. !Si,
I

lines 26-30; R. 152, lines 1-8) that persons managing other ti...

..I

nesses in which he was involved are treated differently from
manner in which he dealt with Belmont because "we are not

partners ... they are employees," the clear inference being tha>

I

Belmont was regarded as a partner.

I

Robinson testified that he and Giles met,

in May, with Lr j

Stone and other partners of the Future Interests partnership
132,

1:\

I

lines 13-29) "to discuss the possibilities of exercising.·1

purchase option."

(R.

133,

lines 1 and 2).

Mr. Stone's recol·

lection (R. 159, lines 7-11) was that "they were two gentlemen I
I

we met one evening after the club was operating.

They represerl

I

themselves as Mr. Belmont and Mr. Olinyk's partners.

And~~[

that they also owned or were partners in a business called the\

I
Doctor."

I

William Buxton, an employee of The Winery, testified ili~
he had been "introduced to [Giles and Robinson] as part owners
that he saw Robinson and Giles at The Winery when "things woui:,
come up maybe once a week" and they would be "checking on thine:.
talking to Mr. Belmont, that sort of thing"; that he saw them (
at

Th e Winery engaged in those activities as late as "sometime

!
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around the end of May." (R. 223, passim).

So clearly had it

been impressed upon him that they were part owners of the business
that he had no reservations about their simply walking into the
kitchen of the business and removing food.

(R. 224).

Robinson's and Giles' assertion of ownership interest by
exercise of domain over partnership property shows clearly in the
testimony of Robinson that in addition to the food, he and Giles
removed chairs and a cash register from the business premises.
(R. 142, lines 26-30).

While Robinson claims that that property

was "borrowed," and claimed that he could only guess from whom the
property was borrowed, he did admit that the "borrowed" property
was never returned to The Winery.

(R. 143).

So completely had Robinson and Giles involved themselves in
the operation of business of the partnership, that Belmont, who
had principal authority and responsibility for operation of the
business (R. 107, lines 4-6; R. 149, lines 6-16), excluded them
from the restaurant.

In explaining that exclusion, Belmont stated

that he had "received some complaints from the employees as to who
they were going to obey.
told them."

My set of rules or what they came in and

(R. 191, lines 8-10).

Robinson minimized the involvement, saying that, "Tony was
awfully mad at us for interfering with turning down the lights or
some such item" (R. 118), but complained that Belmont's reaction
to his "comments or suggestions that we felt were appropriate to
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the business ... was that we were meddling into the daily aper
tions of the club and the restaurant."

( R. 111 , 1 ines

16-21j

lines 26 and 27).
The legislature of the State of Utah has mandated that:
When a person by words spoken or
written or by conduct represents
himself, or consents to another's
representing him, to anyone as a
partner, in an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is
liable to any such person to whom
such representation has been made
who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the
actual or apparent partnership,
and, if he has made such representation or consented to its
being made in a public manner,
he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has
not been made or communicated to
such person so giving credit by,
or with the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its
being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if
he were an actual member of the
parntership." 48-1-13 U.C.A.
(1953), as amended.
The "person" in this matter "who has, on the faith of sue
representation, given credit for the actual or apparent partnf'.·
credi·
ship" is Belmont, he having satisfied the debts of t ra de

tors and others, who had 1 ikewise extended credit to the partr'I
ship·

No person testified that Robinson or Giles objected whe:
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they were introduced to employees as "part owners," and, in fact,
they themselves "represented themselves as Mr. Belmont and Mr.
Olinyk' s partners."

( R. 159, lines 7-11) .

No more "public

manner" could be imagined by which a declaration of partnership
could be made known to interested persons.
No reliance need be placed on the testimony of the defendants in this matter in concluding existence of a partnership;
the plaintiff (essentially an incorporated partnership (R. 120,
lines 1-10)) through its agents, has regaled the record with
demonstrations of involvement with the business of the partnership, as a partner.

Thus, while the court might have found that

pre-conditions had not been met and that the written partnership
agreement was therefore void, it could not properly ignore
the plaintiff's own testimony describing involvement in and
conduct of a true partnership business.

Whether the plaintiff

was heedless or careless of the written agreement or whether it,
through its agents, acquiesced in or condoned operation of the
partnership without performance of pre-conditions was rendered
immaterial by actual operation of the partnership.

The truth is,

that to such extent as necessary, the pre-conditions were so far
performed as to effect the practical result which was the accomplished goal of the partnership--operation of a private club
and restaurant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-11- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The plain facts are that the parties regarded and conduc·,'
themselves as partners; that at some point the plaintiffrespondent determined to do whatever was necessary to wi thdr 2,
from the partnership because of operating losses; that plaintr'
respondent gave no indication of its intent until Belmont
personally advanced $20, 000

(which,

h~

I
f

in any event, he was not

required to do) to exercise an option on behalf of the partnership--resulting in a $20,000 loss which could have been
avoided;

that plaintiff-respondent seized upon conditions of;

long ignored contract to escape pro rata liability for a $36,'\
operating loss.
Neither law nor equity countenances such duplicity in

bus:\

ness dealings, and this Court should condemn the bad faith con'.I
of the plaintiff-respondent which was given sanction by the
court.
DATED this 29th day of

tr:l
i
I

)

I{,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this39th day of October, 1980,
I mailed two (2) true copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS to the attorney for the plaintiff-respondent herein,
Ellen Maycock, of Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman & Maycock, Attorneys
at Law, 620 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, by mailing said copies through the United States Mail, postage prepaid.
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